Disaster Management — From Relief to Risk Reduction
Hazard, Exposure, Vulnerability, Risk and Resilience
A hazard is a potentially damaging event or process — an earthquake, a cyclone, a chemical release. It becomes a disaster only when it meets people and assets that are exposed to it and vulnerable to it: located in its path, and unable, for physical, social or economic reasons, to withstand it. Capacity — warning systems, safe buildings, trained responders, savings, social networks — works in the opposite direction. Risk is the product of these: conceptually, risk rises with hazard, exposure and vulnerability and falls with capacity. Resilience is the ability of a community or system to resist, absorb, adapt to and recover from a hazard’s effects in good time, while preserving its essential functions. The Disaster Management Act 2005 builds the same idea into its definition: a disaster is a catastrophe or grave occurrence, from natural or man-made causes, or by accident or negligence, causing substantial loss of life, suffering, or damage to property or the environment, and of such a nature or magnitude as to be beyond the coping capacity of the community of the affected area.
| Term | Meaning | Reducing it (or raising it, for capacity) |
|---|---|---|
| Hazard | The physical event or process that can cause harm | Rarely possible for natural hazards; possible for human-made ones — safer processes, smaller hazardous inventories |
| Exposure | People and assets located where the hazard can reach | Land-use zoning, keeping settlement off floodplains and unstable slopes, timely evacuation |
| Vulnerability | Conditions that make the exposed more likely to be harmed — weak buildings, poverty, poor health, exclusion | Building codes and retrofitting, livelihood diversification, insurance, attention to the elderly, disabled and the poor |
| Capacity | Strengths and resources available to cope and recover | Early warning, trained volunteers and responders, shelters, drills, local plans |
Classifying Disasters, and India’s Hazard Profile
The standard division is by origin. Natural hazards are geological (earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, volcanic activity), hydro-meteorological (cyclones, floods, droughts, cloudbursts, heat and cold waves, avalanches, hailstorms, lightning) and biological (epidemics, pandemics, pest and locust attacks, livestock disease). Human-made disasters are industrial and chemical, nuclear and radiological, and accident-related — fires, building collapses, stampedes, transport accidents. In India the reference classification is the High Powered Committee on Disaster Management set up in 1999 under J.C. Pant, which listed 31 disaster types in five groups: water and climate related; geologically related; chemical, industrial and nuclear related; accident related; and biologically related. The categories overlap in practice — an earthquake that ruptures a chemical plant, a cyclone that floods a refinery — and these cascading events are why plans are increasingly written for multiple hazards at once.
| Class | Examples | Indian reference point |
|---|---|---|
| Natural — geological | Earthquake, tsunami, landslide, volcanic activity | Bhuj earthquake (2001); Indian Ocean tsunami (2004); Barren Island, India’s only active volcano |
| Natural — hydro-meteorological | Cyclone, flood, drought, cloudburst, heat and cold wave, avalanche, lightning | Odisha super cyclone (1999); Mumbai floods (2005); Uttarakhand (2013); Kerala floods (2018) |
| Natural — biological | Epidemic, pandemic, pest and locust attack, livestock disease | COVID-19, for which the Disaster Management Act was invoked for the 2020 nationwide lockdown |
| Human-made — industrial and chemical | Toxic release, fire, explosion at a hazardous facility | Bhopal gas leak (1984); Visakhapatnam styrene leak (2020) |
| Human-made — nuclear and radiological | Reactor accident, lost or mishandled radioactive source | Mayapuri, Delhi (2010): a cobalt-60 source sold as scrap |
India’s hazard profile is best described by region and mechanism. The Himalaya and the Northeast, where the Indian plate pushes into the Eurasian, lie in the highest zone of the Bureau of Indian Standards’ seismic map and also carry the landslide, avalanche, cloudburst and glacial-lake-outburst risk of young, steep mountains. The Indo-Gangetic and Brahmaputra plains flood every monsoon as heavily silted rivers overtop and shift their channels. The east coast faces far more cyclones than the west, because the Bay of Bengal generates more of them than the Arabian Sea, and its low, densely settled deltas magnify storm surge. Both coasts and the islands are exposed to tsunami, as 2004 showed. The rain-shadow interior of the peninsula and the north-west are drought-prone; the north-western and central plains bear the worst heat waves; the Western Ghats combine intense rain with steep slopes. Over all of this lie two human layers: fast-growing cities that flood and burn, and industrial clusters that carry chemical risk.
The Disaster Management Act 2005 and the Institutions It Creates
Before 2005 disaster management in India meant relief: state relief codes and manuals, a relief commissioner, and a nodal role for the Ministry of Agriculture until 2002, when the subject passed to the Ministry of Home Affairs (drought stayed with Agriculture). Three events forced a different design — the Odisha super cyclone of 1999, the Bhuj earthquake of 2001 and the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 — and the Disaster Management Act 2005 created a tiered system of authorities that plan in advance, at national, state and district level, with a specialist response force and a national institute alongside. Disaster management is named in none of the Seventh Schedule’s three lists, and the long-standing position, restated in the national policy, is that the primary responsibility rests with the states, with the Union supplementing their effort.
| Body | Chaired / headed by | Role |
|---|---|---|
| National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) | The Prime Minister, ex officio; up to nine other members nominated by the chairperson, one of whom may be vice-chairperson | The apex body: lays down national policy, plans and guidelines for disaster management |
| National Executive Committee (NEC) | The Union Home Secretary (secretary of the ministry in charge of disaster management) | Assists NDMA and coordinates the Union ministries in preparedness and response |
| State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) and State Executive Committee | The Chief Minister; the executive committee by the Chief Secretary | State policy and State Plan, in line with national guidelines |
| District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) | The Collector, District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner; the elected representative of the local authority as co-chairperson | District Plan; the planning and coordinating body where response actually happens |
| National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) | Functions within the broad policies and guidelines laid down by NDMA | Training, research, documentation and capacity building |
| National Disaster Response Force (NDRF — the Force) | A Director General appointed by the Union; general superintendence vested in NDMA | Specialist search, rescue and response; battalions drawn from the Central Armed Police Forces |
- Nodal ministries by hazard. Home Affairs for disaster management overall and for most natural hazards; Agriculture for drought and pest attacks; Health and Family Welfare for biological disasters; the Department of Atomic Energy for nuclear and radiological emergencies; Environment, Forest and Climate Change for chemical and industrial disasters.
- National Policy on Disaster Management, 2009. The first national policy, and the formal statement of the paradigm shift: a holistic, proactive, multi-hazard and technology-driven strategy built on a culture of prevention, mitigation and preparedness, rather than post-event relief.
- National Disaster Management Plan, 2016, revised in 2019. The first national plan prepared under the Act, explicitly aligned with the Sendai Framework’s priorities, and organised as responsibility matrices that assign each ministry and agency its role in each phase for each hazard.
Paying for It: Response Funds and Mitigation Funds
Disaster finance in India has followed the Finance Commissions. A Calamity Relief Fund for each state dates from the Ninth Finance Commission, and a National Calamity Contingency Fund was added later for calamities of severe nature. In 2010, following the Thirteenth Finance Commission and the Act, these became the State Disaster Response Fund (SDRF) and the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF — the Fund). The SDRF is the first line: the Union contributes 75% of a state’s allocation, and 90% for the north-eastern and Himalayan states, and the money is spent on a list of notified disasters at norms the Union sets. The NDRF supplements it when a disaster is severe enough, after an inter-ministerial assessment. The Act also provided, in Sections 47 and 48, for mitigation funds at national and state level — and for fifteen years they existed only on paper, which is the clearest measure of how relief-centric the system remained even after the law changed.
The Fifteenth Finance Commission (award period 2021–26) changed that. It recommended a disaster risk management fund at each level with two windows — a response fund and a mitigation fund — and split the allocation 80:20 between response and mitigation, so that the National and State Disaster Mitigation Funds were finally operational. Mitigation money is meant for local, community-level measures that reduce risk before the event; large structural projects remain with regular development budgets. The point for an answer is the principle rather than the arithmetic: a rupee spent on mitigation is spent before anyone is harmed, and a system that funds only response pays every time for the same damage.
The Disaster Management Cycle and Early Warning
| Phase | What it means | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Mitigation (pre-disaster) | Reducing the impact a hazard can have, permanently | Structural: building codes, retrofitting, embankments, cyclone shelters. Non-structural: land-use zoning, code enforcement, insurance, mangrove belts |
| Preparedness (pre-disaster) | Being ready to act when the hazard comes | Early warning, evacuation plans, mock drills, stockpiles, trained volunteers and responders |
| Response (during and immediately after) | Saving lives and meeting immediate needs | Search and rescue, emergency medical care, relief camps, water, food, restoring communication |
| Recovery (post-disaster) | Rehabilitation and reconstruction that leave the community safer than before | Housing to safer standards, livelihoods, psychosocial care — "build back better" |
An early warning is a chain, not a forecast: detection, forecast, dissemination and action, and a break at any link makes the others worthless. India’s chain is split by hazard among specialist agencies. The India Meteorological Department is the Regional Specialised Meteorological Centre for tropical cyclones over the North Indian Ocean, and issues cyclone warnings in four stages — pre-cyclone watch, cyclone alert, cyclone warning and post-landfall outlook — increasingly as impact-based, colour-coded warnings that say what the storm will do rather than only how strong it is. The Indian Tsunami Early Warning Centre at INCOIS, Hyderabad, set up in 2007 because India had no tsunami warning in 2004, monitors undersea earthquakes and sea level. The Central Water Commission issues river level and reservoir inflow forecasts, using IMD’s rainfall forecasts as an input. Alerts reach phones through NDMA’s integrated alert system built on the Common Alerting Protocol. The weakest link is usually the last one — the warning that arrives but is not acted on, because the village has no shelter, no plan, or no reason to trust it.
| Hazard | Agency | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Cyclone, heat wave, cold wave, heavy rain | India Meteorological Department (Ministry of Earth Sciences) | Regional centre for the North Indian Ocean; four-stage cyclone warnings |
| Tsunami | INCOIS, Hyderabad (Ministry of Earth Sciences) | Indian Tsunami Early Warning Centre, operational since 2007 |
| River floods | Central Water Commission (Ministry of Jal Shakti) | Level and inflow forecasts at its flood forecasting stations |
| Earthquake | National Centre for Seismology (Ministry of Earth Sciences) | Monitors and reports; earthquakes cannot be predicted, so safety rests on codes |
| Landslide | Geological Survey of India (Ministry of Mines) | Nodal agency; susceptibility mapping and regional early warning |
| Category | Wind speed (knots) |
|---|---|
| Depression | 17–27 |
| Deep depression | 28–33 |
| Cyclonic storm | 34–47 |
| Severe cyclonic storm | 48–63 |
| Very severe cyclonic storm | 64–89 |
| Extremely severe cyclonic storm | 90–119 |
| Super cyclonic storm | 120 and above |
The Global Frameworks: Hyogo to Sendai, and CDRI
The United Nations declared the 1990s the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, which produced the Yokohama Strategy (1994). The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015, adopted at Kobe in January 2005 weeks after the Indian Ocean tsunami, made disaster risk reduction a national and local priority. Its successor, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, was adopted at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai, Japan, in March 2015 and endorsed by the General Assembly. Sendai’s shift is from managing disasters to managing risk: it widens the scope to small and slow-onset disasters, to human-made and biological hazards, and to health. It is voluntary and non-binding; the state has the primary role, shared with local government, the private sector and other stakeholders.
- Understanding disaster risk — in all its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure and hazard.
- Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk.
- Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience.
- Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and to "build back better" in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
| Target | By 2030 (unless stated) |
|---|---|
| (a) Mortality | Substantially reduce global disaster mortality — average per 100,000 in 2020–2030 lower than in 2005–2015 |
| (b) Affected people | Substantially reduce the number of people affected, on the same comparison |
| (c) Economic loss | Reduce direct economic loss in relation to global GDP |
| (d) Infrastructure and services | Reduce damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services such as health and education |
| (e) Strategies | Increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies — by 2020 |
| (f) International cooperation | Substantially enhance cooperation with developing countries |
| (g) Early warning | Substantially increase the availability of, and access to, multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information |
Four Case Studies, and What Each Changed
A case study earns marks when it is used as evidence for a claim — that warnings work only with shelters, that industrial siting is a disaster decision, that a fragile valley has a carrying capacity. Each of these events took many lives and changed many more, and the respectful way to use them is the analytical one: what happened, why it was as bad as it was, and what was done differently afterwards. Where official and independent counts of the dead differ, say so rather than choosing the more dramatic number.
| Event | What happened | What changed afterwards |
|---|---|---|
| Odisha super cyclone, October 1999 | A super cyclonic storm made landfall near Paradip; storm surge flooded the low-lying coastal districts, and the official toll was nearly ten thousand lives. | Odisha set up a state disaster management authority in 1999, years before the national Act, built community-managed multipurpose cyclone shelters, a state rapid action force and a culture of drills. When Phailin (2013) and Fani (2019) struck, mass evacuations kept deaths in the tens. |
| Bhopal gas leak, December 1984 | On the night of 2–3 December, methyl isocyanate escaped from a storage tank at the Union Carbide India Limited pesticide plant into the surrounding settlements. Thousands died, and many more lived with lasting illness; official and independent tolls differ. | The Environment (Protection) Act 1986; hazardous chemical rules (1989) requiring on-site and off-site emergency plans; chemical accident rules (1996); and the Public Liability Insurance Act 1991. The 1989 settlement of US$470 million was widely criticised as inadequate. |
| Uttarakhand, June 2013 | Very heavy rain, as the early monsoon met a western disturbance, brought flash floods and debris flows down the Mandakini; the breach of the Chorabari lake above Kedarnath struck the town at the height of the pilgrimage season. Thousands of pilgrims and residents died or were never found. | Attention to construction on riverbanks and floodplains, the carrying capacity of pilgrim routes, registration of pilgrims, radar coverage in the hills, and the role of hydropower projects in fragile valleys — a question the Supreme Court took up. |
| Kerala floods, August 2018 | Exceptionally heavy monsoon rain caused the state’s worst floods since 1924, with landslides in the hills; reservoirs that were already full had to release water during the peak. Hundreds died and very large numbers were displaced. | A Post-Disaster Needs Assessment and the Rebuild Kerala Initiative framed recovery as "build back better"; debate on reservoir operation, floodplain encroachment and Western Ghats ecology (the Gadgil and Kasturirangan reports). Fishing communities’ boats became a defining part of the rescue. |
Heat, Urban Floods, Landslides — and the Community
Heat waves are the quiet disaster: no collapsed buildings, deaths spread across days and often recorded under other causes, and the heaviest burden on outdoor workers, the elderly, the poor and people in poorly ventilated housing. IMD declares a heat wave for a plains station once its maximum is at least 40°C (37°C on the coast, 30°C in the hills) and either departs from normal by 4.5°C or more (6.5°C or more is severe), or reaches 45°C on actual temperature alone (47°C is severe). The response is the Heat Action Plan, pioneered by Ahmedabad in 2013 after the 2010 heat wave — the first in South Asia — and since promoted by NDMA’s guidelines: an early warning tied to temperature thresholds, public messaging, preparing hospitals and health workers, drinking water and shade, changing working hours, and cool roofs. Its weakness is that most plans are short-term emergency measures without a dedicated budget, and do little for the urban heat island itself.
Urban flooding is a different problem from river flooding, and NDMA recognised it with separate guidelines in 2010. It is caused less by the volume of rain than by what the city has done to the ground: storm drains designed for lower intensities, wetlands, lakes and natural drainage channels built over, paved surfaces that do not absorb, and solid waste blocking what drains remain. Mumbai’s flood of 26 July 2005, when over 900 mm of rain fell at Santacruz in a day, and Chennai’s in 2015 are the standard references. The remedies are drainage master plans, protecting and restoring water bodies, permeable surfaces and rainwater harvesting, local rainfall and waterlogging warnings, and land-use enforcement — which is a governance answer before it is an engineering one.
Landslides concentrate in the Himalaya, the Northeast and the Western Ghats, where steep slopes, weathered rock and intense rain meet, and they are increasingly triggered by people: road cutting without slope protection, deforestation, blocked drainage, and construction loads on unstable ground — the land subsidence at Joshimath in 2023 made that link visible. The Geological Survey of India is the nodal agency and maps landslide susceptibility; the measures are hazard zonation tied to building permission, slope stabilisation and drainage, regulated construction on hill roads and towns, and rainfall-threshold warnings for vulnerable slopes.
Key takeaways
- A hazard becomes a disaster only through exposure and vulnerability, and capacity reduces the risk. The Disaster Management Act 2005 defines a disaster — natural, man-made, accidental or negligent — by whether it is beyond the coping capacity of the affected community.
- The Act’s tiers: NDMA under the Prime Minister, NEC under the Union Home Secretary, SDMA under the Chief Minister, DDMA under the Collector with the elected local representative as co-chair; plus NIDM for training and research and the National Disaster Response Force for specialist response.
- The National Policy of 2009 stated the shift from relief to prevention, mitigation and preparedness; the National Plan of 2016, revised in 2019, aligned India with Sendai. The response funds (SDRF, NDRF) are old; the mitigation funds became operational only with the Fifteenth Finance Commission’s 80:20 split.
- Mitigation changes what a hazard can do; preparedness changes how ready people are when it comes. Warnings are a chain — IMD for cyclones and heat, INCOIS Hyderabad for tsunamis, the Central Water Commission for floods, GSI for landslides — and fail at the last link without shelters, plans and trust.
- Sendai 2015–2030 succeeded Hyogo 2005–2015: voluntary, from managing disasters to managing risk, four priorities beginning with understanding risk, seven targets — four to reduce, three to increase. CDRI, launched by India in New York in 2019, works on resilient infrastructure.
- Cases as evidence: Odisha after 1999 shows that warnings plus shelters plus drills save lives; Bhopal produced India’s chemical-safety and liability law; Uttarakhand 2013 is about carrying capacity in fragile valleys; Kerala 2018 about reservoirs, floodplains and building back better. Heat, urban floods and landslides are rising, and community-based DRR works where the warning chain usually breaks.
Practice questions (18)
Attempt each one before opening the answer. Every explanation names the tempting wrong option as well as the right one, because that is where marks are lost.
Under the Disaster Management Act 2005, the National Disaster Management Authority is chaired by:
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Answer: B — The Prime Minister
The Prime Minister is the ex officio chairperson of NDMA, with up to nine other members nominated by the chairperson. The Union Home Secretary is the tempting choice because the Home Ministry is the nodal ministry — but the Home Secretary chairs the National Executive Committee, the body that assists NDMA, not the Authority itself. The Cabinet Secretary chairs the National Crisis Management Committee, and the Home Minister, though politically responsible for the subject, does not chair NDMA.Who chairs a District Disaster Management Authority under the Disaster Management Act 2005?
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Answer: C — The Collector, District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner
The Act makes the Collector, District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner the chairperson, because the district’s administrative head is the one who can direct every department in an emergency. The elected representative of the local authority is the trap: that person is the co-chairperson, not the chair, which is the Act’s way of giving local democracy a seat without splitting command. The Superintendent of Police and the Chief Medical Officer are members whose departments respond, not the chair.According to the definition in the Disaster Management Act 2005, what makes a grave occurrence a "disaster"?
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Answer: D — It must be beyond the coping capacity of the affected community
The Act’s test is coping capacity: the occurrence must be of such a nature or magnitude as to be beyond the coping capacity of the community of the affected area. The first option is the commonest misconception — the definition expressly includes man-made causes, accident and negligence, which is why Bhopal-type events fall within it. There is no death threshold in the definition, and the Act has no procedure for declaring a "national calamity"; severity matters for funding, not for whether an event is a disaster.A strong earthquake strikes an uninhabited inland desert and causes no loss of life or property. In disaster-management terms, this event is best described as:
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Answer: A — A hazard event that did not become a disaster, as nothing was exposed
A disaster needs a hazard to meet exposed and vulnerable people or assets; with nothing exposed, the earthquake remains a hazard event. The second option is the trap of measuring a disaster by the size of the hazard — magnitude describes the earthquake, not its consequences, which is the same error as reading a cyclone’s strength from its death toll. An earthquake is sudden-onset, not slow-onset. And a tsunami needs an undersea earthquake, which an inland one is not; in any case a tsunami would be the secondary hazard, not the primary one.In the context of disaster management in India, "NDRF" refers to:
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Answer: D — Both a response force and a response fund under the Act
The Act constitutes both: the National Disaster Response Force under Section 44, a specialist force of battalions drawn from the Central Armed Police Forces, and the National Disaster Response Fund under Section 46. Either "only" option is the trap of knowing one half of the acronym — and the context of a question (deployment versus money) is what tells you which one is meant. The Army does assist civil authorities in disasters, but the NDRF is not an Army formation.The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction covers the period:
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Answer: C — 2015–2030
Sendai was adopted in March 2015 and runs to 2030. 2005–2015 is the Hyogo Framework for Action, which it replaced. 2016–2030 is the trap for anyone thinking of the Sustainable Development Goals, whose implementation began in 2016. And 2020–2030 is the decade whose average disaster mortality Sendai’s first target compares against 2005–2015 — a real date from the framework, but not its period.Which of the following is NOT one of the seven global targets of the Sendai Framework?
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Answer: A — A legally binding national cap on annual disaster losses
Sendai is a voluntary, non-binding framework, so a legally binding cap is exactly what it does not contain — and the word "binding" is the clue. The other three are genuine targets: (c) economic loss relative to GDP, (g) early warning and risk information, and (d) critical infrastructure and basic services. The trap is to treat Sendai like a treaty with obligations, when its seven targets are global outcomes measured against a 2005–2015 baseline, four to reduce and three to increase.What is the first of the four priorities for action under the Sendai Framework?
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Answer: B — Understanding disaster risk
The order is understanding risk, governance, investment, then preparedness and build back better — and the logic is that you cannot govern or invest against a risk you have not first understood. Governance is the most common wrong choice because it sounds like the foundation, but it is second. "Build back better" is the phrase most associated with Sendai, which makes the last option tempting, yet it sits in the fourth priority, attached to recovery.India’s tsunami early warning centre is operated by:
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Answer: D — INCOIS, Hyderabad
The Indian Tsunami Early Warning Centre is at the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS), Hyderabad, under the Ministry of Earth Sciences, and has been operational since 2007 — set up because India had no tsunami warning in 2004. IMD is the tempting answer because it issues cyclone warnings, but tsunami warning is an ocean-observation task. The National Remote Sensing Centre is also in Hyderabad, which is the trap in the second option; it is ISRO’s satellite data centre. GSI is the nodal agency for landslides, not tsunamis.River flood forecasts — water levels and reservoir inflows at forecasting stations — are issued in India by:
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Answer: A — The Central Water Commission
The Central Water Commission, under the Ministry of Jal Shakti, runs the flood forecasting network and issues level and inflow forecasts. IMD is the trap because its rainfall forecasts are an input to those forecasts — but forecasting the rain and forecasting the river are separate jobs held by separate agencies. NDMA lays down policy and guidelines and disseminates alerts; it does not run hydrological forecasting. The Central Ground Water Board deals with groundwater, not surface floods.The gas that leaked from the Union Carbide plant at Bhopal in December 1984 was:
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Answer: C — Methyl isocyanate
Methyl isocyanate (MIC), an intermediate in the manufacture of pesticides, escaped from a storage tank on the night of 2–3 December 1984. Phosgene is the closest trap: it was one of the raw materials used at the plant to make MIC, so it appears in accounts of the disaster, but it was not the gas that spread over the city. Chlorine and hydrogen sulphide are toxic industrial gases associated with other accidents, not with Bhopal.Which law requires an enterprise handling hazardous substances to take insurance so that victims of an accident receive immediate relief on a no-fault basis?
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Answer: B — The Public Liability Insurance Act 1991
The Public Liability Insurance Act 1991 obliges the owner of an undertaking handling hazardous substances to carry insurance, so that relief reaches victims immediately without anyone first having to prove fault — the gap Bhopal’s long litigation exposed. The Environment (Protection) Act 1986 is the strongest distractor, because it was the umbrella law enacted after Bhopal and the chemical-safety rules are made under it, but it does not create this insurance duty. The Disaster Management Act sets up institutions and funds, and the National Green Tribunal Act creates the forum that hears environmental claims rather than the insurance obligation.Which state set up India’s first state disaster management authority, years before the Disaster Management Act 2005?
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Answer: A — Odisha
Odisha created its state disaster management authority in 1999, after the super cyclone, by executive decision. Gujarat is the deliberate trap: it set up an authority after the 2001 Bhuj earthquake and passed the first state disaster management law in 2003, so it holds a different "first" — the first state Act, not the first authority. Tamil Nadu’s and Andhra Pradesh’s coasts are cyclone- and tsunami-prone, which makes them plausible, but neither preceded Odisha.The destruction at Kedarnath in June 2013 was greatly worsened by:
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Answer: D — The breach of the Chorabari lake above the town during extreme rainfall
Extreme rainfall, as the early monsoon interacted with a western disturbance, caused flash floods and debris flows, and the breach of the Chorabari lake above Kedarnath sent a surge of water and debris into the town. There was no earthquake: the landslides were rain-triggered, which is the trap in the first option. The Tehri dam is on the Bhagirathi, not the Mandakini, and did not fail. And no cyclone was involved — the weather system was the monsoon meeting a western disturbance.For a station in the plains, IMD declares a heat wave on the basis of actual maximum temperature alone when it reaches at least:
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Answer: C — 45°C
On actual temperature alone, 45°C is a heat wave for a plains station and 47°C a severe heat wave. 40°C is the trap: it is the threshold the maximum must reach before a heat wave is considered at all, after which the departure from normal — 4.5°C or more — decides it. 47°C is the severe-heat-wave mark, and 42°C has no role in the criteria.The Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) was launched by India at:
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Answer: B — The UN Climate Action Summit in New York, 2019
CDRI was launched at the UN Climate Action Summit in New York in September 2019, with its secretariat in New Delhi. COP21 in Paris is the trap for anyone mixing up India’s two coalitions — the International Solar Alliance was launched there in 2015. The Sendai conference adopted the Sendai Framework, not CDRI, though CDRI serves that framework’s infrastructure target. And the 2023 G20 in New Delhi came four years after CDRI already existed.Which change in India’s disaster financing is associated with the Fifteenth Finance Commission?
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Answer: C — Operational mitigation funds beside the response funds
The Fifteenth Finance Commission recommended a disaster risk management fund at national and state level with response and mitigation windows in an 80:20 split, which finally made the mitigation funds the 2005 Act had provided for operational. The renaming of the calamity funds as SDRF and NDRF is the closest trap, but it came in 2010, after the Thirteenth Finance Commission. The Calamity Relief Fund dates from the Ninth Finance Commission, and the move of the subject to the Home Ministry in 2002 was an administrative decision, not a Finance Commission award.Retrofitting existing school buildings to the seismic code, before any earthquake has occurred, is an example of:
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Answer: B — Mitigation
Retrofitting permanently changes what an earthquake can do to the building, which makes it mitigation. Preparedness is the trap, because it is also a pre-disaster phase — but preparedness changes how ready people are to act (warnings, drills, stockpiles), not the vulnerability of the structure itself; an evacuation drill in the same school would be preparedness. Response happens during and just after the event, and recovery afterwards, so neither fits a measure taken before any earthquake.