Cognition: Thinking, Problem Solving, Decision Making and Intelligence
2. Current paradigms: information processing and the ecological approach
The information-processing approach treats the mind as a system that takes in, codes, stores, transforms and outputs information in a sequence of stages, by analogy with a computer. It studies these stages with measures such as reaction time and accuracy, and asks whether operations run in series or in parallel and where the bottlenecks lie. It is the dominant paradigm behind the memory and attention models.
The ecological approach, associated with James Gibson, challenges the computational picture for perception. It argues that the optic array already contains rich, invariant information, so perception is direct — picking up this information — rather than the construction of the world from impoverished retinal data by heavy internal inference. Its signature idea is the affordance: an object's perceived possibilities for action (a chair affords sitting, a handle affords grasping), defined relative to the perceiver's body and goals.
| Feature | Information processing | Ecological (Gibson) |
|---|---|---|
| Core metaphor | Mind as a computer, stages of processing | Organism in an information-rich environment |
| View of perception | Constructed by inference from sparse input | Direct pickup of invariants and affordances |
3. Problem solving, strategies, obstacles and metacognition
A problem has an initial state, a goal state and operators that move between them. Well-defined problems state all three clearly; ill-defined problems leave the goal or the means vague. Two broad methods contrast. An algorithm is a step-by-step procedure that is guaranteed to find a solution if one exists, but may be slow or exhaustive. A heuristic is a rule-of-thumb shortcut that is fast and usually works but carries no guarantee.
- Means-end analysis (Newell and Simon's General Problem Solver) repeatedly reduces the difference between the current and goal states, setting up subgoals. Working backward starts at the goal and reasons toward the start, useful when the goal is well specified. Analogy maps the solution of a known problem onto a new one.
- Obstacles derail solving. A mental set is the tendency to persist with a method that worked before even when a simpler one exists (Luchins' water-jar problems). Functional fixedness is the inability to see an object used in an unusual way (Duncker's candle problem: the box of tacks is also a shelf). Confirmation bias seeks evidence that fits a favoured hypothesis and ignores evidence against it.
- Metacognition is thinking about one's own thinking — knowledge of one's cognitive processes plus their regulation (planning, monitoring progress, and evaluating the outcome). Good problem solvers monitor whether a strategy is working and switch when it is not, which is what distinguishes expertise as much as raw knowledge does.
4. Decision making: choosing among alternatives
A normative model says we should choose the option with the highest expected utility (the value of each outcome weighted by its probability). In practice people use heuristics that are efficient but systematically biased. The availability heuristic judges how likely or frequent something is by how easily examples come to mind, so vivid or recent events are over-estimated. The representativeness heuristic judges probability by resemblance to a prototype, ignoring the base rate — which produces the conjunction fallacy, rating a specific conjunction as more probable than one of its own components.
The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic ties an estimate to an initial value and then adjusts too little from it, so an arbitrary starting number sways the final judgement. The framing effect shows that logically identical choices draw different decisions depending on wording: people tend to be risk-averse for a choice framed as gains and risk-seeking for the same choice framed as losses, a core finding of Tversky and Kahneman's prospect theory.
5. Theories of intelligence and emotional intelligence
Because scores on different mental tests tend to correlate positively, Spearman proposed a two-factor theory: a single general factor g underlies all intellectual tasks, with each task also drawing on a specific factor s. A test's loading on g, obtained by factor analysis, measures how far it taps general ability. Thurstone disputed a single g and identified several primary mental abilities (such as verbal comprehension, numerical ability, spatial ability, word fluency, memory, perceptual speed and reasoning).
| Theorist | Central claim |
|---|---|
| Jensen | Level I (associative, rote learning) and Level II (abstract reasoning) |
| Cattell | Fluid intelligence (reasoning on the novel) vs crystallised (acquired knowledge) |
| Gardner | Multiple independent intelligences (linguistic, spatial, musical, bodily, and more) |
| Sternberg | Triarchic: analytical, creative and practical intelligence |
Emotional intelligence (EI) extends the idea beyond cognition. In the ability model of Mayer and Salovey, EI is the capacity to perceive, use, understand and manage emotions in oneself and others; Goleman's popular account mixes in traits such as motivation and social skill. EI predicts outcomes that a classical IQ test does not, but critics warn that the mixed models blur the line between ability and personality.
6. Measuring intelligence; heredity, environment, aptitude and creativity
Binet and Simon introduced the idea of a mental age (MA) — the age level of problems a child can pass. Stern's ratio IQ then expressed ability relative to age: IQ = (MA / CA) × 100, where CA is chronological age, so an average child scores 100. Because the ratio breaks down in adulthood (mental age plateaus while CA keeps rising), modern tests such as the Wechsler scales use a deviation IQ: a standard score placing a person against the age-group mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. The standard individual tests are the Stanford–Binet (Terman's revision of the Binet–Simon scale) and the Wechsler scales (WAIS for adults, WISC for children); Raven's Progressive Matrices is a non-verbal test of reasoning on novel patterns that is designed to reduce the influence of language and schooling.
Individual differences in intelligence reflect both heredity and environment. Twin and adoption studies show substantial heritability, but environment matters too: enrichment, schooling and nutrition raise scores, and the Flynn effect — the steady rise in average test scores over the twentieth century — is too fast to be genetic. The standard synthesis is the reaction range: genes set a band of possible outcomes, and the environment decides where within that band a person falls.
- Intelligence is a broad, general capacity to learn and reason. Aptitude is the potential to acquire a specific skill with training — an aptitude test predicts future performance in a particular domain rather than measuring general ability now.
- Creativity is the ability to produce ideas that are both novel and useful. It rests on divergent thinking (generating many varied possibilities) rather than the convergent thinking (converging on the one correct answer) that IQ tests reward, which is why intelligence and creativity correlate only modestly.
Key takeaways
- Thought is built from concepts (formal, by rule; natural, around a prototype), propositions (the smallest true-or-false unit of meaning) and analog mental imagery, shown by Shepard and Metzler's mental-rotation times rising with angle.
- The information-processing paradigm treats the mind as staged computation; Gibson's ecological approach treats perception as the direct pickup of invariants and affordances from an information-rich environment.
- Algorithms guarantee a solution but can be slow; heuristics are fast but fallible (means-end analysis, working backward, analogy). Obstacles are mental set, functional fixedness and confirmation bias, and metacognition is monitoring and regulating one's own problem solving.
- Decisions ideally maximise expected utility; in practice the availability, representativeness and anchoring heuristics bias judgement, and framing makes people risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses (prospect theory, Tversky and Kahneman).
- Spearman's g (two-factor), Thurstone's primary abilities, Jensen's two levels, Cattell's fluid/crystallised, Gardner's multiple intelligences and Sternberg's triarchic theory are the main accounts, with emotional intelligence added by Mayer-Salovey and Goleman.
- Ratio IQ = (MA/CA) × 100 (modern tests use deviation IQ, mean 100, SD 15). Intelligence reflects heredity and environment within a reaction range (the Flynn effect is environmental); intelligence is general, aptitude is domain-specific potential, and creativity rests on divergent thinking.
Practice questions (16)
Attempt each one before opening the answer. Every explanation names the tempting wrong option as well as the right one, because that is where marks are lost.
In the study of concepts, a 'prototype' is best described as:
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Answer: B — the most typical or representative example of a category
A prototype is the most typical member of a natural category, around which graded membership is organised, so a robin is a better prototype of 'bird' than a penguin. A strict rule set describes a formal concept, not a prototype; the true-or-false unit is a proposition; and the perception-preserving representation is a mental image.Shepard and Metzler found that the time people take to judge whether two rotated shapes are the same rises in proportion to the angle between them. This result is taken as evidence that mental imagery is:
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Answer: C — an analog representation that preserves spatial, perception-like properties
A reaction time that grows linearly with rotation angle implies the image is manipulated much like a physical object — an analog, spatial representation. A purely propositional code would not predict the angle-dependent timing; an exemplar list concerns category storage, not rotation; and the finding shows imagery precisely can be manipulated.Which of the following correctly describe the information-processing and ecological paradigms in cognitive psychology?
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Answer: A — The information-processing approach models the mind as stages of coding, storage and transformation, by analogy with a computer; B — Gibson's ecological approach holds that perception is the direct pickup of information from a rich optic array; C — An 'affordance' is the perceived possibility for action that an object offers a perceiver
The computer analogy of staged processing, Gibson's direct pickup from a rich optic array, and the notion of affordance are all stated correctly. The claim that perception is built by heavy internal inference from sparse data is the information-processing (constructive) view, which Gibson's ecological approach explicitly rejects.A chess program that evaluates every legal sequence of moves to a fixed depth before choosing is using which kind of problem-solving method?
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Answer: D — An algorithm, because it systematically and exhaustively evaluates the options
Exhaustive, systematic evaluation of all options to a set depth is an algorithm, which guarantees finding the best move within that depth at the cost of effort. A heuristic would prune the search with a shortcut and give no guarantee; functional fixedness is an obstacle, and insight is a sudden non-search solution — neither describes a brute-force evaluation.A person needs to mount a candle on a wall. On the table sit a candle, a book of matches and a box of thumbtacks. They fail to see that the tack box, once emptied, can be tacked to the wall as a candle holder. This failure is an example of:
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Answer: B — Functional fixedness, failing to see an object used in a new way
Seeing the box only as a container and not as a possible shelf is functional fixedness, the classic Duncker candle problem. Confirmation bias concerns weighing evidence for a hypothesis; the availability heuristic concerns probability judgement; and means-end analysis is a solving strategy, not an obstacle, so none fits a failure to repurpose an object.Which of the following statements about problem-solving obstacles and metacognition are correct?
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Answer: A — A mental set is the tendency to keep using a previously successful method even when a simpler one exists; B — Metacognition includes planning, monitoring and evaluating one's own thinking; C — Confirmation bias is the search for evidence that supports a favoured hypothesis while neglecting contrary evidence
Mental set, the components of metacognition, and confirmation bias are all stated correctly. The description of an algorithm is wrong: an algorithm is an exhaustive procedure that guarantees a solution; the fast, no-guarantee rule of thumb is a heuristic.Told that Tom is quiet, orderly and fond of detail, most people judge him more likely to be a librarian than a salesperson, even though salespeople vastly outnumber librarians. This judgement reflects:
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Answer: A — the representativeness heuristic, matching the description to a stereotype while ignoring base rates
Judging by similarity to a stereotype of 'librarian' while disregarding how many salespeople there are is the representativeness heuristic neglecting the base rate. Anchoring concerns adjusting from a starting number, framing concerns gain/loss wording, and expected-utility maximisation is the normative rule the judgement actually violates here.A treatment described as having a '90% survival rate' is chosen far more often than the identical treatment described as having a '10% mortality rate'. This is most directly an instance of:
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Answer: D — the framing effect
Logically identical options drawing different choices because of gain versus loss wording is the framing effect. The availability heuristic concerns judging frequency from ease of recall, functional fixedness is a problem-solving obstacle, and the conjunction fallacy is rating a conjunction above its own component — none turns on the survival/mortality wording.Spearman's two-factor theory of intelligence proposes that performance on any mental test depends on:
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Answer: A — a general factor g common to all tasks plus a factor s specific to each task
Spearman's theory has exactly two kinds of factor: a single general factor g that runs through every task and a task-specific factor s. The independent primary abilities are Thurstone's, the multiple independent intelligences are Gardner's, and the analytical-creative-practical triad is Sternberg's.An older adult scores as well as ever on tests of vocabulary and general knowledge but more slowly on puzzles requiring reasoning about wholly novel patterns. In Cattell's terms this contrast is between:
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Answer: A — crystallised intelligence, which holds up, and fluid intelligence, which declines
Crystallised intelligence is accumulated knowledge (vocabulary, facts) and tends to hold up or grow with age, while fluid intelligence is reasoning about novel material and tends to decline — exactly the described pattern. Level I/II is Jensen's distinction and the analytical/practical split is Sternberg's, neither of which is Cattell's fluid–crystallised contrast.Which pairing of a theorist with their account of intelligence is correct?
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Answer: C — Sternberg — a triarchic theory of analytical, creative and practical intelligence
The triarchic theory of analytical, creative and practical intelligence is Sternberg's. The single g is Spearman's (Thurstone argued for several primary abilities), the analytical-creative-practical triad belongs to Sternberg rather than Gardner, and the multiple independent intelligences are Gardner's, not Cattell's (who proposed fluid and crystallised intelligence).Which of the following statements about theories of intelligence are correct?
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Answer: A — Thurstone identified several primary mental abilities rather than a single general factor; B — In Mayer and Salovey's ability model, emotional intelligence is perceiving, using, understanding and managing emotions; C — Gardner proposed multiple relatively independent intelligences rather than one unitary ability
Thurstone's primary mental abilities, the Mayer–Salovey ability model of EI, and Gardner's multiple intelligences are all correct. The statement about Spearman is false in the opposite direction: Spearman's g was derived precisely by using factor analysis of the positive correlations among tests, not by rejecting it.A child of chronological age 8 years performs on an intelligence test at the level of an average 10-year-old. Using the ratio IQ formula IQ = (MA/CA) × 100, what is the child's IQ? Give the number only.
Numerical answer — type the value.
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Answer: 125
Mental age MA = 10 and chronological age CA = 8, so IQ = (10/8) × 100 = 1.25 × 100 = 125. Inverting the ratio to (8/10) × 100 = 80 is the usual slip; mental age is the numerator.On a ratio IQ scale, a child has a tested mental age of 12 years and an IQ of 80. Using IQ = (MA/CA) × 100, what is the child's chronological age in years? Give the number only.
Numerical answer — type the value.
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Answer: 15
Rearranging the formula, CA = (MA/IQ) × 100 = (12/80) × 100 = 0.15 × 100 = 15 years. Multiplying instead of dividing, (12 × 80)/100 = 9.6, is the usual error.In a factor analysis of mental tests, a reasoning test has a loading of 0.60 on the general factor g. The proportion of that test's variance accounted for by g equals the square of its loading. What is that proportion? Give the answer as a decimal to two places.
Numerical answer — type the value.
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Answer: 0.36
The variance explained by a single factor is the square of the loading: 0.60² = 0.36. Using the loading itself (0.60) instead of its square is the common error — the loading is a correlation, and variance explained is its square.Which statement best captures the standard distinction among intelligence, aptitude and creativity?
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Answer: A — Intelligence is a general capacity, aptitude is potential for a specific skill, and creativity is producing novel and useful ideas
Intelligence is broad and general, aptitude is the potential to acquire a particular skill, and creativity is novel-and-useful output resting on divergent thinking. Treating the three as one g is wrong; the claim that aptitude measures present general ability while intelligence predicts one domain reverses the two; and creativity depends on divergent, not convergent, thinking.