Heterodox Systems, the Upaniṣads and Gītā, and the Theistic Schools

This second chapter of Section XH4.1 Classical Indian Philosophy, within the Philosophy option (XH4) of the Humanities and Social Sciences paper, answers the rest of the heading: “Heterodox Systems: Cārvāka … Jainism … Buddhism …”, “Upaniṣads, Bhagavadgītā, and Dharmaśāstras”, and “Kāṣmira Śaivism, Śaivasiddhānta, Vīra Śaivism, Śāktism and Vaiṣṇavism”. It covers the three nāstika (heterodox) systems that reject Vedic authority — Cārvāka materialism, Jaina non-absolutism (anekāntavāda and syādvāda), and Buddhism (its four schools, momentariness, no-self, dependent origination, two truths, trikāya and the bodhisattva ideal); the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and the Dharmaśāstras (Brahman–Ātman, pañca-kośa, parā/aparā-vidyā, dharma, ṛta, puruṣārtha, varṇāśramadharma, karma-yoga and the law of karma); and the theistic traditions — Kāṣmīra Śaivism, Śaivasiddhānta, Vīra Śaivism, Śāktism and Vaiṣṇavism. The traps are distinguishing the four Buddhist schools, and telling the monistic Kāṣmīra Śaivism from the pluralistic Śaivasiddhānta.

1. Cārvāka: materialism, perception and hedonism

Cārvāka (Lokāyata), Indian materialism, accepts only one pramāṇa — pratyakṣa (perception). It rejects anumāna (inference) because an inference rests on vyāpti (an invariable universal connection), and no universal can itself be established by perception without begging the question; it likewise rejects śabda (testimony), since words only report what someone else may merely have inferred or imagined. With inference gone, so are God, the soul apart from the body, the unseen fruit of ritual, rebirth and liberation — none of them perceived.

On its metaphysics, only the four perceptible elements — earth, water, fire and air — are real (ākāśa is dropped as imperceptible). Consciousness (caitanya) is not a separate substance but an emergent property that arises when these elements combine in a living body, as the power to intoxicate arises from fermenting ingredients that have no such power singly; at death the combination dissolves and consciousness ends. In ethics Cārvāka is a hedonist: of the four aims of life it keeps only artha (wealth) and kāma (pleasure) as ends, and dismisses dharma and mokṣa. The watchword is to enjoy this life, the only one there is.

⚠️ One pramāṇa, not two
Do not confuse Cārvāka with Vaiśeṣika. Vaiśeṣika accepts two pramāṇas (perception and inference); Cārvāka accepts only perception and is the one school in this syllabus that denies inference its validity. That denial is the root from which Cārvāka's whole materialism follows.

2. Jainism: anekāntavāda, syādvāda and the path

Jaina metaphysics is a realistic pluralism dividing all that exists into jīva (the conscious soul, infinite in number, by nature all-knowing) and ajīva (the non-conscious), the latter comprising pudgala (matter, which is atomic), dharma (the medium of motion), adharma (the medium of rest), ākāśa (space) and, on most lists, kāla (time). Karma is subtle matter that flows into (āsrava) and binds (bandha) the soul; the full tattva scheme runs jīva, ajīva, āsrava, bandha, saṃvara (stoppage of inflow), nirjarā (shedding of karma) and mokṣa.

Because the soul is many-sided and so is every object, Jaina epistemology is anekāntavāda, the doctrine of the many-sidedness of reality: no single standpoint grasps the whole (the blind men and the elephant). Its logical expression is syādvāda, conditional predication: every judgement is prefixed by syāt ("from a standpoint, in some respect"). This yields the saptabhaṅgī, the seven-fold scheme, beginning syād asti (in a respect, it is), syān nāsti (in a respect, it is not), syād asti ca nāsti ca (in respects, it is and is not) and syād avaktavyam (in a respect, it is inexpressible), with three further combinations. The point is not scepticism but that affirmation and denial are each true under a stated respect.

  • Pramāṇas in Jainism are two, pratyakṣa (direct) and parokṣa (indirect), set within five kinds of knowledge: mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥparyāya and kevala. Mati and śruta are indirect; avadhi, manaḥparyāya and kevala are direct, kevala being complete omniscience. Partial standpoints (nayas) show how a single aspect of a thing is grasped.
  • Mokṣa is the soul's complete release from karmic matter; freed, it regains its innate kevala-jñāna (omniscience) and rises to the summit of the universe. The means is the three jewels (ratnatraya): right faith, right knowledge and right conduct.
  • Conduct is coded in five vows. The mahāvratas (great vows) for ascetics are ahiṃsā (non-injury), satya (truth), asteya (non-stealing), brahmacarya (celibacy) and aparigraha (non-possession); the aṇuvratas are the same five observed partially, as lesser vows, by the laity.

3. Buddhism: impermanence, no-self and dependent origination

The canon is the Ti-piṭaka ("three baskets"): the Vinaya (monastic discipline), the Sutta (discourses) and the Abhidhamma (systematic doctrine). Two theses run through all Buddhist thought. Anityavāda (impermanence) sharpened into the doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda): nothing endures; what looks like a persisting thing is a stream of momentary existents, each arising and perishing instantly, replaced by the next. Anātmavāda (no-self) denies any permanent substantial self behind experience: what we call a person is the pañca-skandha, the five aggregates — rūpa (form), vedanā (feeling), saṃjñā (perception), saṃskāra (mental dispositions) and vijñāna (consciousness).

In place of a self and a creator, Buddhism explains all arising by pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination): "this being, that arises; this ceasing, that ceases." Nothing comes into being independently; every event depends on conditions. The classic formulation is the twelve nidānas, a causal chain running from avidyā (ignorance) through saṃskāra, vijñāna, nāma-rūpa, the six sense-fields, contact, feeling, craving (tṛṣṇā), grasping, becoming, birth, to old-age-and-death — the wheel of suffering and rebirth, which the path breaks by removing ignorance and craving.

🎯 Why no-self needs momentariness
If each existent lasts only a moment, there is no enduring thing for a permanent self to be. Personal identity across time is then a causal continuity of momentary states, like a flame passing along a line of lamps, not a single abiding substance — which is exactly what anātmavāda asserts and pratītyasamutpāda explains without a self.

4. The four Buddhist schools, two truths, and the bodhisattva ideal

The four philosophical schools of Buddhism
SchoolPositionView of external objects
Sarvāstivāda (Vaibhāṣika)Direct realism; "all exists" across past, present and futureExternal things are directly perceived
SautrāntikaRepresentative realismExternal things are inferred from mental copies, not directly perceived
Yogācāra (Vijñānavāda)Idealism: only consciousness is realThere are no external objects; they are forms of mind (ālaya-vijñāna)
Mādhyamika (Śūnyavāda)Nāgārjuna: all is śūnya, empty of own-beingNeither real nor unreal; being dependent, things lack svabhāva

The doctrine of two truths (satya-dvaya), developed especially by Nāgārjuna, distinguishes saṃvṛti-satya (conventional or empirical truth, true for ordinary transaction) from paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth, the emptiness of all things). Buddhist logic, as developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, accepts two pramāṇas — perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna).

  • Mahāyāna ideals: the bodhisattva aspires to Buddhahood for the sake of all beings and, out of compassion, holds back from final nirvāṇa, against the arhat ideal of individual release. The path is the ṣaḍ-pāramitās (six perfections): dāna, śīla, kṣānti, vīrya, dhyāna and prajñā; upāyakauśalya is the bodhisattva's skill in adapting the teaching to the hearer.
  • The trikāya (three bodies of the Buddha): dharmakāya (the body of truth, the Buddha's essence), sambhogakāya (the body of bliss, enjoyed in celestial realms) and nirmāṇakāya (the manifested earthly body). The brahmavihāras (four sublime attitudes) are maitrī, karuṇā, muditā and upekṣā; the lay pañcaśīla abstains from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, false speech and intoxicants.

5. The Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and the Dharmaśāstras

The Upaniṣads teach a pure monism: the one reality is Brahman, and it is identical with the innermost self, Ātman — "tat tvam asi" (that thou art), "ahaṃ brahmāsmi" (I am Brahman). The self is reached by seeing past the pañca-kośa, the five sheaths of the Taittirīya — annamaya (food/body), prāṇamaya (vital breath), manomaya (mind), vijñānamaya (intellect) and ānandamaya (bliss). The Muṇḍaka distinguishes parā-vidyā, the higher knowledge by which the imperishable Brahman is known, from aparā-vidyā, the lower knowledge of the Vedas, rituals and sciences.

  • Ṛta is the cosmic and moral order of the Ṛgveda, the forerunner of dharma (from dhṛ, "to uphold": righteous duty, law). The four puruṣārthas (aims of life) are dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. The Kaṭha contrasts śreyas (the good, which brings true welfare) with preyas (the pleasant); the wise choose śreyas.
  • Varṇāśramadharma assigns duties by one's varṇa and stage of life (āśrama). Svadharma is one's own station-specific duty, distinguished from sādhāraṇa dharma, the common duties (truth, non-injury) binding on all. The three ṛṇas (debts) — to the gods, the sages and the ancestors — are discharged by sacrifice, study and progeny.

The Bhagavadgītā teaches karma-yoga, the path of desireless action: one has a right to the deed but not to its fruits, so act without attachment (niṣkāma karma). Its ideal person is the sthitaprajña, steady in wisdom, unmoved by pleasure and pain and free of craving; and the enlightened act for lokasaṃgraha, the holding-together and welfare of the world. Underlying all of this is the law of karma: every deed bears a morally fitting fruit and so shapes rebirth, the mechanism of saṃsāra that liberation finally transcends.

6. Kāṣmīra Śaivism, Śaivasiddhānta, Vīra Śaivism, Śāktism and Vaiṣṇavism

Kāṣmīra Śaivism (the Trika; Vasugupta, Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta) is a monistic idealism. Its Pratyabhijñā ("recognition") school teaches that liberation is the sudden recognition that one's own self is none other than Śiva. Śiva is pure consciousness (prakāśa) and Śakti is his power of self-awareness (vimarśa); the world is not an illusion but the real self-manifestation of Śiva's free will (svātantrya). Kriyā — the power of action, one of Śiva's five śaktis (cit, ānanda, icchā, jñāna and kriyā) — is therefore real and divine, expressed in Śiva's five acts (pañcakṛtya): creation, maintenance, dissolution, concealment and grace.

Śaivasiddhānta (strong in the Tamil South; Meykandar) is, by contrast, a pluralistic realism of three eternal categories — pati (the Lord, Śiva), paśu (the bound souls) and pāśa (the bonds). Śiva acts through his śakti and is proved to exist as the intelligent efficient cause of a world that, being an effect, needs a maker. The soul is bound by three malas — āṇava (the impurity of finitude), karma and māyā — and is freed by Śiva's grace, acting through guru and discipline; in liberation the soul attains the nature of Śiva yet remains distinct from him, union without identity.

  • Vīra Śaivism (Liṅgāyatism; Basava, 12th-century Karnataka) is a śakti-viśiṣṭādvaita — non-dualism qualified by śakti. The devotee wears the iṣṭaliṅga and advances through the ṣaṭsthala, six stages toward union with Śiva; it rejects caste hierarchy and empty ritual and honours work (kāyaka) as worship.
  • Śāktism worships the Divine Mother, Śakti (Devī), as the supreme reality and dynamic creative power of the universe, often in a Tantric key. Vaiṣṇavism worships Viṣṇu (Kṛṣṇa, Nārāyaṇa) as supreme and is devotional (bhakti) to the core; its philosophical foundations are the theistic Vedāntas — Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita, Madhva's Dvaita, Nimbārka's Dvaitādvaita and Vallabha's Śuddhādvaita.
⚠️ Monist Kashmir, pluralist Siddhānta
Both are Śaiva, but their metaphysics are opposite. Kāṣmīra Śaivism is monistic: the soul is ultimately identical with Śiva, recognised through pratyabhijñā. Śaivasiddhānta is pluralistic: pati, paśu and pāśa stay eternally distinct, and even the liberated soul is like Śiva but never becomes Śiva.

Key takeaways

  • Cārvāka accepts only perception, rejects inference and testimony, recognises only the four perceptible elements, treats consciousness as emergent from matter, and is hedonist (kāma and artha as ends, dharma and mokṣa denied).
  • Jainism divides reality into jīva and ajīva, treats karma as matter, and teaches anekāntavāda (many-sidedness) with syādvāda's seven-fold predication (saptabhaṅgī); mokṣa via the three jewels, ethics via the five mahāvratas (ascetics) and aṇuvratas (laity).
  • Buddhism: Ti-piṭaka canon; anityavāda sharpened to momentariness; anātmavāda with the five skandhas; pratītyasamutpāda (twelve nidānas). The four schools are Sarvāstivāda (direct realism), Sautrāntika (representative realism), Yogācāra (idealism) and Mādhyamika (śūnyavāda), with the two-truths doctrine.
  • Mahāyāna ethics: the bodhisattva ideal (over the arhat), six pāramitās, upāyakauśalya, the trikāya (dharma-, sambhoga-, nirmāṇa-kāya), four brahmavihāras and the lay pañcaśīla.
  • The Upaniṣads teach Brahman = Ātman, the pañca-kośa and parā/aparā-vidyā. The Gītā teaches karma-yoga (niṣkāma karma), the sthitaprajña and lokasaṃgraha; ṛta, dharma, the four puruṣārthas, śreyas over preyas, varṇāśrama, svadharma/sādhāraṇa dharma, the three ṛṇas and the law of karma order the moral life.
  • Kāṣmīra Śaivism is monist (pratyabhijñā: self = Śiva; Śiva–Śakti, kriyā real); Śaivasiddhānta is pluralist (pati–paśu–pāśa, three malas, union without identity). Vīra Śaivism is śakti-viśiṣṭādvaita; Śāktism worships Śakti/Devī as supreme; Vaiṣṇavism rests on the theistic Vedāntas.

Practice questions (17)

Attempt each one before opening the answer. Every explanation names the tempting wrong option as well as the right one, because that is where marks are lost.

  1. Which means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) does the Cārvāka school accept?

    1. Perception and inference, the two means also accepted by the Vaiśeṣika school
    2. Perception, inference and verbal testimony, exactly as the Sānkhya school accepts
    3. All six means, including postulation and non-apprehension, as the Bhāṭṭa school accepts
    4. Perception (pratyakṣa) alone
    Show answer

    Answer: D — Perception (pratyakṣa) alone

    Cārvāka accepts perception alone and is the one school that denies inference its validity. Vaiśeṣika accepts two (perception and inference), Sānkhya three (adding testimony), and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā six — none of which is the Cārvāka position.

  2. On the Cārvāka view, what is consciousness (caitanya)?

    1. An emergent property that arises when the four material elements combine in a living body
    2. A plurality of eternal puruṣas, each an inactive witness quite distinct from matter
    3. A stream of momentary consciousness-aggregates with no abiding substance behind it
    4. The soul's eternal, all-knowing nature, for a time obscured by particles of karmic matter
    Show answer

    Answer: A — An emergent property that arises when the four material elements combine in a living body

    For Cārvāka consciousness is emergent from matter — it appears when the elements combine in a body and ends at death, like the intoxicating power of fermented ingredients. The plural inactive puruṣa is Sānkhya, the momentary consciousness-stream is Buddhist, and the eternal all-knowing soul obscured by karma is Jaina.

  3. A thinker refuses to grant inference (anumāna) the status of a valid pramāṇa, arguing that its universal premise (vyāpti) can never be established. Which school is this, and what chiefly follows?

    1. Nyāya — which is precisely why it builds knowledge upon a five-membered syllogism
    2. Mīmāṃsā — which is precisely why it grounds the whole of dharma in the Veda alone
    3. Cārvāka — and from the denial of inference follow its denials of God, the soul, rebirth and liberation
    4. Yogācāra — which is precisely why it concludes that consciousness alone, and no external object, is finally real
    Show answer

    Answer: C — Cārvāka — and from the denial of inference follow its denials of God, the soul, rebirth and liberation

    Of the schools named here only Cārvāka rejects inference; from that rejection follow its denials of all that is not perceived — God, an afterlife soul, rebirth and mokṣa. Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Yogācāra all accept inference, so each of those pairings is self-contradictory.

  4. Jaina syādvāda prefixes every judgement with 'syāt'. This chiefly expresses the view that:

    1. No judgement about reality can ever be true, so one must suspend all assertion
    2. A thing may be truly affirmed and truly denied, each from a stated standpoint (anekāntavāda)
    3. Only perception yields a valid judgement, while inference and testimony must be discarded
    4. Every judgement is finally empty of own-being and so is neither true nor false
    Show answer

    Answer: B — A thing may be truly affirmed and truly denied, each from a stated standpoint (anekāntavāda)

    Syādvāda is the logical face of anekāntavāda: each predication holds under a definite respect, so affirmation and denial can both be true of a many-sided reality. It is not scepticism (which denies all truth), not the Cārvāka single-pramāṇa stance, and not the Mādhyamika emptiness of all judgement.

  5. Which of the following statements about Jaina metaphysics and ethics are correct?

    1. Jīva (the conscious) and ajīva (the non-conscious) are the two basic categories
    2. Karma is a form of subtle matter that flows into and binds the soul
    3. The aṇuvratas are the great vows taken in full by monks and ascetics
    4. Mokṣa is the soul's merger into a single supreme personal God
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Jīva (the conscious) and ajīva (the non-conscious) are the two basic categories; B — Karma is a form of subtle matter that flows into and binds the soul

    Jaina reality divides into jīva and ajīva, and karma is subtle matter that binds the soul. The aṇuvratas are the lesser vows for the laity, not the monks' full vows (those are the mahāvratas); and mokṣa is release from karmic matter with the recovery of kevala-jñāna, not merger into a personal God.

  6. The Buddhist canon, the Ti-piṭaka or 'three baskets', consists of which three?

    1. Vinaya, Sutta and Abhidhamma
    2. Ṛg, Yajur and Sāma, the three oldest Vedic collections
    3. Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha, the three refuges a follower takes
    4. Śīla, samādhi and prajñā, the three divisions of the training
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Vinaya, Sutta and Abhidhamma

    The three baskets are the Vinaya (discipline), the Sutta (discourses) and the Abhidhamma (systematic doctrine). The three Vedic collections, the three refuges, and the threefold training (śīla–samādhi–prajñā) are distinct triads, not the Ti-piṭaka.

  7. In Buddhism, in place of a permanent self, a person is analysed into:

    1. The three guṇas — sattva, rajas and tamas — in shifting proportion
    2. The five aggregates (skandhas): rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra and vijñāna
    3. Two eternal principles, an inactive puruṣa and an unconscious prakṛti
    4. A jīva together with the five forms of ajīva, including matter and space
    Show answer

    Answer: B — The five aggregates (skandhas): rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra and vijñāna

    Anātmavāda replaces the self with the five skandhas (form, feeling, perception, dispositions, consciousness). The three guṇas are Sānkhya, puruṣa and prakṛti are Sānkhya-Yoga, and jīva with the forms of ajīva is the Jaina analysis.

  8. A Buddhist school holds that external objects really exist but cannot be perceived directly; they are inferred from the mental representations they cause. Which school is this?

    1. Sarvāstivāda (Vaibhāṣika), for which external objects are directly perceived
    2. Mādhyamika, for which all things are alike empty of any own-being
    3. Sautrāntika, which admits external objects but holds them to be inferred, not perceived
    4. Yogācāra, which denies that any external object whatsoever exists apart from consciousness
    Show answer

    Answer: C — Sautrāntika, which admits external objects but holds them to be inferred, not perceived

    Representative realism — objects exist but are inferred from their mental copies — is Sautrāntika. Sarvāstivāda perceives objects directly (direct realism), Yogācāra denies external objects altogether (idealism), and Mādhyamika holds everything empty of svabhāva.

  9. Nāgārjuna's doctrine of two truths (satya-dvaya) distinguishes which pair?

    1. Parā-vidyā, the higher knowledge, from aparā-vidyā, the lower knowledge of the Vedas and sciences
    2. Pariṇāma (real transformation) from vivarta (merely apparent transformation)
    3. Pati (the Lord), paśu (the bound soul) and pāśa (the bond that binds it)
    4. Saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth) from paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth)
    Show answer

    Answer: D — Saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth) from paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth)

    The two truths are saṃvṛti-satya (conventional, true for ordinary life) and paramārtha-satya (ultimate, the emptiness of all things). Parā/aparā-vidyā is the Upaniṣadic pair, pariṇāma/vivarta is a split over causation, and pati–paśu–pāśa is Śaivasiddhānta.

  10. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the bodhisattva ideal is best contrasted with the arhat ideal in that:

    1. The bodhisattva, moved by compassion, postpones final nirvāṇa to work for the liberation of all beings
    2. The bodhisattva seeks his own individual release as quickly as possible and then withdraws from the world
    3. The bodhisattva denies that nirvāṇa can be attained by anyone at all
    4. The bodhisattva sets aside the six perfections as needless to the path
    Show answer

    Answer: A — The bodhisattva, moved by compassion, postpones final nirvāṇa to work for the liberation of all beings

    The bodhisattva, out of compassion, holds back from final nirvāṇa to help liberate all beings — against the arhat's goal of individual release. The bodhisattva does not seek quick private release, does not deny nirvāṇa, and practises (not abandons) the six pāramitās.

  11. Which of the following statements about Buddhist doctrine are correct?

    1. Pratītyasamutpāda holds that nothing arises independently of its conditions
    2. The doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda) is the sharpened form of anityavāda
    3. Yogācāra is also called Śūnyavāda and was founded by Nāgārjuna
    4. The six pāramitās include dāna, śīla and prajñā
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Pratītyasamutpāda holds that nothing arises independently of its conditions; B — The doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda) is the sharpened form of anityavāda; D — The six pāramitās include dāna, śīla and prajñā

    Dependent origination makes all arising conditioned, momentariness is anityavāda pushed to the limit, and dāna, śīla and prajñā are three of the six perfections. The mismatch is Yogācāra: it is Vijñānavāda, whereas Śūnyavāda is the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna.

  12. Which of the following statements about the four Buddhist schools are correct?

    1. Sarvāstivāda holds that dharmas exist in all three times — past, present and future
    2. Mādhyamika, founded by Nāgārjuna, teaches that all things are empty of own-being
    3. Sautrāntika denies the existence of external objects altogether
    4. Yogācāra holds that external objects are perceived directly, as in naive realism
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Sarvāstivāda holds that dharmas exist in all three times — past, present and future; B — Mādhyamika, founded by Nāgārjuna, teaches that all things are empty of own-being

    Sarvāstivāda asserts the existence of dharmas across the three times (hence 'sarva-asti'), and Mādhyamika teaches universal emptiness. Sautrāntika affirms external objects (inferred, not denied), and Yogācāra denies external objects rather than perceiving them directly.

  13. The pañca-kośa (five sheaths) of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad culminate in which innermost sheath?

    1. Annamaya, the sheath made of food, the gross physical body
    2. Prāṇamaya, the sheath of the vital breaths that animate the body
    3. Manomaya, the sheath of the mind and the activity of the senses
    4. Ānandamaya, the sheath of bliss
    Show answer

    Answer: D — Ānandamaya, the sheath of bliss

    The five sheaths run from the outermost annamaya (food/body) inward through prāṇamaya, manomaya and vijñānamaya to the innermost ānandamaya (bliss). Annamaya, prāṇamaya and manomaya are the outer three, not the innermost.

  14. In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, what is parā-vidyā (the higher knowledge)?

    1. The knowledge of the Vedas, grammar, ritual and the various sciences
    2. The knowledge by which the imperishable Brahman is directly known
    3. Desireless action performed without any attachment to its fruits
    4. The recognition (pratyabhijñā) that one's own self is identical with Śiva
    Show answer

    Answer: B — The knowledge by which the imperishable Brahman is directly known

    Parā-vidyā is the higher knowledge by which the imperishable Brahman is known; the knowledge of the Vedas, ritual and the sciences is aparā-vidyā, the lower knowledge. Desireless action is the Gītā's karma-yoga, and pratyabhijñā is Kāṣmīra Śaivism's recognition.

  15. The Bhagavadgītā's karma-yoga centrally teaches that one should:

    1. Perform one's duty while renouncing attachment to its fruits (niṣkāma karma)
    2. Renounce all action and withdraw entirely into silent contemplation
    3. Perform Vedic rituals chiefly in order to gain the fruit of heaven (svarga)
    4. Choose the pleasant (preyas) in preference to the good (śreyas)
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    Answer: A — Perform one's duty while renouncing attachment to its fruits (niṣkāma karma)

    Karma-yoga is niṣkāma karma: do your duty but give up attachment to its fruits. It does not counsel renouncing action, it is not ritual done for heaven (the Mīmāṃsā aim), and it does not prefer preyas to śreyas — the Kaṭha prefers śreyas.

  16. A Śaiva school holds that pati, paśu and pāśa are three eternally distinct categories, and that the liberated soul attains the nature of Śiva yet never becomes identical with him. This is:

    1. Kāṣmīra Śaivism, whose Pratyabhijñā school identifies the self with Śiva himself
    2. Vīra Śaivism, a śakti-viśiṣṭādvaita that honours work as a form of worship
    3. Śaivasiddhānta, a pluralistic realism of pati, paśu and pāśa
    4. Śāktism, which worships the Divine Mother as the supreme creative power
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    Answer: C — Śaivasiddhānta, a pluralistic realism of pati, paśu and pāśa

    The pati–paśu–pāśa scheme with union-without-identity in liberation is Śaivasiddhānta's pluralistic realism. Kāṣmīra Śaivism is monist (the self is identical with Śiva, recognised by pratyabhijñā); Vīra Śaivism is śakti-viśiṣṭādvaita; and Śāktism worships Śakti, not the pati–paśu–pāśa triad.

  17. Which of the following statements about the theistic schools and the concepts of dharma are correct?

    1. In Kāṣmīra Śaivism the world is the real self-manifestation of Śiva's free will, not an illusion
    2. Svadharma is the common duty binding equally on all persons, such as truth and non-injury
    3. Vaiṣṇavism's philosophical foundations include Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita and Madhva's Dvaita
    4. In the Ṛgveda, ṛta names the cosmic and moral order that precedes the concept of dharma
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    Answer: A — In Kāṣmīra Śaivism the world is the real self-manifestation of Śiva's free will, not an illusion; C — Vaiṣṇavism's philosophical foundations include Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita and Madhva's Dvaita; D — In the Ṛgveda, ṛta names the cosmic and moral order that precedes the concept of dharma

    Kāṣmīra Śaivism treats the world as Śiva's real self-manifestation, Vaiṣṇavism rests on the theistic Vedāntas (Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita and others), and ṛta is the Ṛgvedic order prior to dharma. The error is svadharma: that is station-specific duty, whereas the common duties binding on all are sādhāraṇa dharma.